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The Currency Demand Approach (CDA) is the most popular method to estimate the shadow 
economy among the so-called indirect macroeconomic approaches. Originally suggested by 
Cagan (1958), the CDA was subsequently refined and applied by Tanzi (1980, 1983) to the 
U.S. economy, and has been (and still is) widely adopted in the literature (among the more 
recent contributions, see Ferwerda et al., 2010). The CDA measures the size of the shadow 
economy in two stages: 1) the econometric estimation of an aggregate money demand 
equation, with a specific component related to cash transactions in the underground sector; 2) 
the computation of the value of these shadow transactions via the quantity theory of money. 
The key assumptions for the first-stage estimation are that shadow transactions are settled in 
cash to avoid traceability, and that the main cause of the underground economy is a high tax 
burden. The CDA involves estimating the aggregate cash demand including among the 
regressors both standard explanatory variables of the preference for liquidity (like the interest 
rate on deposits) and specific variables identifying the determinants of the shadow economy 
(like the tax burden). The demand for cash associated with shadow transactions is then 
computed as the difference between the estimated demand for cash in the full model and the 
demand obtained by setting to zero all the determinants of the underground economy (i.e., 
the demand for cash motivated only by regular transactions). 
In the Tanzi (1980, 1983) application of the CDA to the U.S. economy, the dependent 
variable in the money demand equation is the cash to money supply ratio. This ratio is 
regressed on three variables identifying the determinants of money demand for regular 
transactions (the share of wages paid in cash on the national income, the interest rate on 
savings deposits, and the average income per capita), plus the average tax rate on personal 
income, which is considered to be the sole determinant of the shadow transactions. Since a 
basic assumption of the CDA is that a higher tax burden stimulates a higher evasion, which 
in turn causes an increase in the demand for cash, the expected sign on the income tax rate is 
positive. First stage estimation of the money demand equation confirms this view. In the 
second stage, the estimate of the shadow economy to GDP is obtained by exploiting the 
Fisher equation MV = PT (where M is the stock of liquid assets, V is the velocity of money, P 
is the price level, and T the volume of transactions). In particular, Tanzi defines a base year   3
in which the contribution of the shadow economy to GDP is assumed to be zero, and 
computes the velocity of money as the ratio between the official GDP (PT) and the stock of 
liquid assets (M). Assuming then that this velocity is the same for the regular economy and 
the shadow sector, the value of the latter is obtained by multiplying V for the estimated 
‘excess demand’ for cash. 
Schneider and Enste (2000, 2002) identify and discuss many substantial drawbacks of the 
CDA, pointing to three main criticisms of the basic assumptions of this methodology:1 the 
absence of any transactions in the shadow economy in a given base year; the same velocity of 
money in both the official and the irregular economy; the excessive tax burden as the only 
determinant of the shadow economy. Our aim here is to contribute to the debate on the 
measurement of the shadow economy by proposing a revision of the CDA that overcome all 
these three drawbacks. In particular, we propose a ‘modified – CDA’ introducing three main 
innovations to the traditional methodology: first, we take a direct measure of cash 
transactions (the flow of cash withdrawn from bank accounts relative to total noncash 
payments) as the dependent variable in the money demand equation, which avoid using the 
Fisher equation; second, we include among covariates two distinct measures of ‘detected’ tax 
evasion, in place of the tax burden level; finally, we also control for a new ‘criminal’ 
component of the shadow economy, considering money demand for illegal activities like drug 
dealing and prostitution. We then propose an original application of this ‘modified – CDA’ to 
Italy, a country where the weight of the shadow economy is remarkable compared to other 
Western countries. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the innovations we 
introduce in the CDA, and how these help overcome (most of) the drawbacks highlighted by 
Schneider and Enste (2000, 2002). In section 3 we present the application of our ‘modified – 
CDA’ to Italy, discussing the model specification and the estimation results. In particular, 
besides country level estimates, we examine also disaggregated territorial estimates for 
country macro-areas. We finally include here a comparison with the estimates obtained in 
other studies on Italy. Section 4 provides brief concluding remarks. 
 
                                                 
1 Ahumada et al. (2007) and Breusch (2005) point to critiques specifically related to econometric issues, partly 
addressed by Pickhardt and Sarda (2010) within the standard CDA approach.   4
2. Reinterpreting the Currency Demand Approach 
Our starting point are the criticism to most of the assumptions of the traditional CDA 
advanced by Schneider and Enste (2000, 2002). We focus here on three main issues: (1) the 
hypothesis of the absence of any transactions in the shadow economy in a given base year is 
rather unrealistic; (2) the assumption of equality in the velocity of money for both the official 
and the irregular economy introduces a restriction in the estimation method which is not 
justified on reasonable grounds; (3) also considering the excessive tax burden as the only 
determinant of the shadow economy is a quite restrictive assumption, as other factors – such 
as markets regulation (especially the labour market regulation), the trust in political 
institutions, and the citizens’ tax morale – can substantially affect the decision to participate 
in the underground sector. 
To avoid these critiques, we introduce three innovations in this study as compared to the 
traditional CDA a là Tanzi. First, instead of using the stock of liquid assets as the dependent 
variable in the money demand equation, here we take a direct measure of cash transactions: 
the flow of cash withdrawn from bank accounts with respect to total payments settled by 
instruments other than cash. This is a substantial modification of the model, which eliminates 
the need to rely on the quantitative theory of money and the Fisher equation. In this way, we 
are able to overcome the critique (1), concerning the need to arbitrarily chose a base year for 
calculating the velocity of money, and the critique (2), concerning the equality assumption of 
the velocity of money in both the official economy and the shadow sector. Notice that the 
cash withdrawals we refer to also help to deal with the problematic measurement of the stock 
of liquid assets in each country of the EMU zone after the introduction of the euro, which can 
severely limit the application of the traditional CDA.  
Second, in order to answer critique (3), direct measures of detected tax evasion are included 
among the factors determining the (irregular) transactions settled in cash. In this way, we 
remove the need to identify a set of variables that can adequately capture all the relevant 
determinants of the phenomenon besides the level of tax burden, which is the key variable in 
the classic Tanzi-approach and does not take into account the presence of other possible 
factors underlying the decisions of noncompliance (e.g., Ferwerda et al., 2010; Schneider, 
2010).   5
Finally, with reference again to criticism (3), we argue that evasion is just one component of 
the shadow economy. Hence, the methodology we propose also controls for the presence of 
criminal transactions. These are shadow transactions not motivated by a high tax burden or 
other reasons which could lead a taxpayer to carry out legal productive activities usually 
object of revenue collection by Tax Authorities in an irregular way. We consider in particular 
two criminal activities like drug dealing and prostitution, which are illegal transactions 
typically regulated in cash. Almost all scholars agree in classifying these among the activities 
that make up the underground economy.2 According to the definition proposed, among 
others, by Smith (1994, p. 18), «the shadow economy includes any market-based production of 
goods and services, whether legal or illegal, that escapes detection in the official estimates of GDP». 
Notice that these transactions identify a second important component of the shadow 
economy, with distinct origins and different implications in terms of law enforcement policies. 
The choices of individuals operating in the two sectors of the underground economy (evasion 
and crime) are affected by different motivations and incentive mechanisms, including the role 
played by deterrence actions. The two components also differ remarkably in terms of their 
effects on public finances, as it is possible to identify potential revenue subtracted to Tax 
Authorities only for shadow economy due to evasion. Despite these differences, the 
decomposition of total shadow economy in tax evasion and crime is an issue rarely 
investigated in the literature, mainly because of the difficulty in delineating the boundaries of 
the analysis and the lack of reliable information.3 Here we focus on crime indicators related to 
both drug dealing and prostitution, defining more precisely the excess demand of money due 
to evasion and that due to crime, and introducing a third innovation with respect to the 
traditional CDA. 
                                                 
2 See the classification originally proposed by Lippert and Walker (1997) and subsequently integrated by 
Schneider and Enste (2000, 2002) and Schneider (2010). 
3 For a comprehensive analysis of the shadow economy in different countries with a discussion of the 
contribution of the two components, see the study by Thomas (1992). A recent application that takes into 
account the role of criminal activities and relies on the traditional CDA is Ferwerda et al. (2010). In particular, 
to reply to criticism (3) raised by Schneider and Enste (2000, 2002), the authors propose some modifications to 
the Tanzi-approach, by including in the model several proxies for the determinants of the shadow economy in 
substitution of the income tax rate. The variables considered are unemployment rate, government expenditure 
indicators, crime indicators, and measures of the degree of education and social inequality. However, the results 
are judged unsatisfactory by the authors, since none of the proxies adopted significantly explains the shadow 
economy as measured by excess demand for cash. The authors conclude therefore by highlighting the need to 
identify variables more closely related to the decision to operate in the underground sector. Our contribution 
goes just in this direction and also tries to disentangle the criminal component of the shadow economy.   6
3. An application of the ‘modified – CDA’ 
3.1. Defining the demand for cash payments 
In this section of the paper we provide a first application of the ‘modified – CDA’ to a 
balanced panel of 91 Italian provinces observed from 2005 to 2008. We first need to discuss 
the definition of the demand for cash payments, and then its determinants. As for the 
demand of cash payments, departing from the standard CDA, we exploit information on the 
flow of cash rather than the stock of liquid assets. Hence, we base our assessment of the size of 
the shadow economy on a direct measure of the value of transactions at the provincial level. 
In particular, the dependent variable in the estimated equation of the demand for cash 
payments is the ratio of the value of cash withdrawn from bank accounts to the value of total 
payments settled by instruments other than cash (CASH). This represents a measure of the 
demand for untraced payments per euro of traceable ones (i.e., payments settled by bank 
transfers, cheques, credit cards). 
The transactions theory of money demand relies on liquid assets as such (e.g., M1) rather 
than on the concept of payment, the latter necessarily implying a cash flow and precise 
technical and organizational procedures by which these flows circulate in the economy. 
However, even in the presence of reliable statistics, stock indicators can be highly inaccurate 
for three reasons: a) quantifying the level of national currency used outside national borders 
is problematic, and this is particularly true in the Euro area after the euro entered circulation 
in 2002; b) a certain amount of money can be held for purposes other than transactions: 
traditional theories of money demand discuss, for instance, the ‘speculative motive’ for 
holding money reserves; c) the velocity of money is assumed to be constant with respect to 
several GDP components, including the informal sector, without taking into account, inter 
alia, trade in intermediate goods and services. Hence, there may be compensatory phenomena 
within the same stock of banknotes in circulation, both between different purposes for 
holding money reserves, and between the use of cash in the formal and the informal sector. 
This is confirmed by the recent trend of the currency-to-GDP ratio in the countries belonging 
to the G10 and to the Eurosystem: the ratio has remained stable or even increased since 2004 
in those countries that should have been more affected by the replacement of banknotes with 
digital money. Similar considerations hold for other stock-based indicators of currency 
demand, such as the stocks of M1 (currency and deposits repayable on demand). Notice that –   7
although being a signal of a higher preference for liquidity – an increase in a stock-based 
monetary aggregate is not informative about the underlying reasons, including for instance 
the rebalancing of portfolio assets, the adjustment in liquidity buffers, the need to hide 
transactions (whether for evading taxes or because they are illegal). The European Central 
Bank has noted that, on the occasion of the so-called cash changeover, the stock of euro 
banknotes in circulation has increased (even compared to M1 or M2) more than the previous 
circulation of national currencies would have suggested (ECB, 2008). According to he ECB, 
«this is reasonable, in particular, in an environment of low interest rates and low inflation 
expectations», not to mention that an estimate up to 20% percent of banknotes in circulation 
is held outside of the Euro area. It then becomes difficult – if not impossible – to estimate the 
component of cash held to settle payments within the underground economy using stock 
infomation. This is the reason why researchers need to select monetary indicators more 
directly related to the transaction motive. 
In order to better clarify this issue, Figure 1 shows the recent trends of the currency-to-GDP 
and the currency-to-M1 ratios as compared to their respective flows in Italy. Two diverging 
trends can be observed: the stocks show a rising trend, while the flows are declining. An 
explanation of the increasing trend of stocks is given by the above mentioned explanation 
provided by the ECB. The decreasing trend of flows is instead consistent with the diffusion of 
electronic payment instruments in commercial transactions, which allow some substitution 
between alternative instruments, at least in the formal economy. Furthermore, the common 
trend of the two flow-based indicators confirms the higher coherence of these indicators with 
the transaction motive of the demand for cash. The combined evidence of such a ‘substitution 
effect’ of cash flows and the growing trend of the stock of banknotes suggests a slowing down 
of the overall velocity of circulation of legal money in order to meet liquidity needs other than 
purely transactional ones. All these considerations seem to support the criticisms raised to the 
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Figure 1. Monetary aggregates in Italy: stocks vs. flows 













































































Currency / (M1 - currency component of M1) (STOCK) Currency / Non cash payments in value (FLOW ) 
 Currency / GDP (STOCK) Currency / GDP (FLOW)
 
Source: own elaboration on Bank of Italy and ISTAT data. 
 
The direct link between flow-based indicators of currency demand and the transaction motive 
of the demand for cash can also be highlighted by looking at micro-data on cash purchases 
collected by the Bank of Italy through the Survey on Household Income and Wealth. Table 1 
illustrates the correlation matrix of two different (macro) currency ratios (based on bank cash 
withdrawals flows divided by other payments transactions) and the percentage of cash 
purchases on total expenditures declared by the Italian households sample in the period 2006-
2008 (nearly the period considered in this study). The correlation coefficients are positive and 
significant in all cases. As one would expect, the ‘ATM cash withdrawals on POS card 
transactions’ ratio shows a higher correlation with the cash expenditure share by Italian 
households than the ‘Total cash withdrawals value flows to total non cash payments’ ratio. 
That is to say, the closer is the monetary indicator to the ‘point of sales’, the higher is the   9
correlation with the household cash expenditures.4 Nevertheless, the wider indicator of cash 
usage ‘Total cash withdrawals value flows to total non cash payments’ better accounts of the 
behaviour of the economic operators as a whole (households, firms, public sector), which 
makes it more appropriate for our purposes. Hence, as described in detail in the next section, 
our empirical model will consider as dependent variable CASH, that is, the ratio of the value 
of cash withdrawals from bank accounts to the value of total payments settled by 
instruments other than cash. 
 
Table 1. Pearson, Spearman and Kendall tau-b correlation coefficients on different cash usage 
indicators a 
Cash usage indicator   Total cash withdrawals value flows 
on total non cash payments b 
ATM cash withdrawals         
on POS card transactions c 
Cash expenditure share by 
Italian households d 
  Pearson correlation 
Total cash withdrawals value 
flows on total non cash payments                        1      
ATM cash withdrawals on POS 
card transactions             0.663                1    
Cash expenditure share by Italian 
households            0.717  
             
0.848                1  
  Spearman correlation 
Total cash withdrawals value 
flows on total non cash payments                        1      
ATM cash withdrawals on POS 
card transactions             0.695                1    
Cash expenditure share by Italian 
households             0.690  
             
0.793                 1  
  Kendall tau-b correlation 
Total cash withdrawals value 
flows on total non cash payments                        1      
ATM cash withdrawals on POS 
card transactions             0.490                1    
Cash expenditure share by Italian 
households             0.490  
             
0.590                 1  
a Each correlation index is based on data for the 20 Italian Regions. All correlation indexes are statistically significant at 1%. 
b Bank of Italy, banking statistics 2006-2008 (average annual value). 
c Bank of Italy, banking statistics 2009. 
d Bank of Italy, Survey on Household Income and Wealth, 2006-2008 (average annual value). 
 
                                                 
4 Exhaustive data on ATM cash withdrawals and POS transactions at regional level are fully available from 
2009. Nevertheless, the stability of payment behaviours over time makes the correlation analysis consistent even 
in the presence of a different period covered by data on cash expenditures.   10 
3.2. Defining the determinants of cash payments 
In line with the discussion in Section 2, we classify the determinants of CASH in three 
groups, thus identifying three components of the demand for cash payments: the structural 
component, the tax evasion component, and the crime component. A description of the 
variables affecting each of the three components is provided below. The Appendix reports 
descriptive statistics and information on data sources (see Tables A1 and A2). 
3.2.1. The structural component of the demand for cash payments 
Drawing from the literature on the demand for cash (e.g., Goodhart and Krueger, 2001), we 
identify four conventional determinants of the structural demand for cash payments: the 
level of economic  development;  the degree of spatial diffusion of banking activities;  the 
technology of  payments; the  interest rate. The level of development of the (formal) economy 
is measured by per capita GDP at the provincial level (YPC). As suggested by several 
authors (e.g., Schneider and Enste, 2000; Schneider, 2010), YPC has a negative expected 
sign: the higher the living standard, the lower the use of cash (and the higher the demand for 
alternative payment instruments). Income is highly correlated to education (both general 
education and ‘financial literacy’), and more education usually leads to a lower use of cash, 
since more educated individuals show greater confidence in alternative payment instruments 
(World Bank, 2005; Ferwerda et al., 2010). 
We use the number of per capita bank accounts (BANK) as a proxy of the spatial diffusion of 
banking activities, thus controlling for the structural impact of the degree of bank branches 
diffusion in provincial economies on the demand for cash payments. The expected sign of 
BANK coefficient is negative, as a higher diffusion of current accounts reduces the need to 
withdraw cash from ATMs for payments. 
Several studies (e.g., Drehmann and Goodhart, 2000; Goodhart and Krueger, 2001; Schneider, 
2009) emphasize the importance of the technology of payments, with a particular reference to 
the supply of electronic instruments. We account for available technology by including the 
variable ELECTRO among the structural determinants of CASH. ELECTRO measures the 
ratio of the value of transactions settled by electronic payments to provincial GDP. Since a 
higher share of electronic transactions (via POS and internet banking) implies a lower number 
of cash transactions, the expected sign of the ELECTRO coefficient is negative.   11 
The interest rate on bank deposits INT is the fourth determinant of the structural 
component of CASH. Based on standard economic theory, the interest rate is expected to 
have a negative effect on the demand for money, via its role of opportunity cost of holding 
cash in alternative to interest-bearing assets. Notice, however, that our model deals with cash 
flows rather than stocks of liquid assets, which implies an ambiguous effect of the interest 
rate.5 Higher interest rates might even have a positive impact on flows, for instance, by 
pushing towards forms of cash raising alternative to the banking channel. However, due to 
the usual ‘speculative’ motive, we can not exclude that the interest rate on bank deposits 
may also negatively affect the propensity to withdraw cash in alternative to the use of other 
payment instruments. Thus, the expected sign of the INT coefficient is a priori unclear. 
3.2.2. The tax evasion component of the demand for cash payments  
We innovate the traditional CDA by considering measures of detected tax evasion instead of 
the usual variables proxying for the tax burden, like the (average) income tax rate. 
Information on detected tax evasion are retrieved from a dataset concerning inspection 
activities with law enforcement purposes by the Guardia di Finanza (the Italian tax police). 
The availability of such information is particularly relevant for two reasons. First, as already 
discussed above, many factors – beyond the burden of taxes and social security contributions 
– would be likely to influence the decision to escape Tax Authorities (market regulation, tax 
morale of citizens, efficiency of public administration, etc.), and each of such factors would 
need a proper proxy.6 Second, since we aim at providing disaggregated territorial estimates of 
the shadow economy, there are no data on the effective tax rate at the provincial level in 
Italy, and the calculation of some measures of fiscal pressure for Italian provinces is not a 
trivial task, as taxes are levied by four different levels of government. In order to overcome 
these problems, we selected two variables that provide a direct measure of the diffusion of the 
productive activities (partially or totally) unknown to Tax Authorities at the provincial level.  
                                                 
5 Several studies investigating the role of innovative payment systems in cash demand of Italian families (e.g., 
Ardizzi and Tresoldi, 2003; Lippi and Secchi, 2008; Alvarez and Lippi, 2009) point out that the progress in 
transaction technology may substantially reduce (or even eliminate) the impact of the interest rate on the cash 
demand of buyers. 
6 For a discussion on the determinants of the agents’ decision to participate in the shadow economy, besides the 
fiscal burden, see, among the others, Friedman et al. (2000), Schneider and Enste (2000, 2002), Feld and Frey 
(2007), Dreher et al. (2009), Torgler and Schneider (2009), and Dreher and Schneider (2010).   12 
EVAS1 is defined by the number of specific tax audits7 in a given province divided by its 
sample mean value (this is a measure of tax evasion intensity at the provincial level) and then 
weighed by a GDP concentration index.8 This latter standardization allows us to compare 
provinces characterized by remarkable differences in the level of economic development, thus 
avoiding attaching higher levels of tax evasion to provinces with a number of audits above 
the sample mean. The second variable (EVAS2) accounts for irregularities detected by the 
Guardia di Finanza during inspections to retailers. EVAS2 is given by the ratio of the 
number of positive audits on cash registers and tax receipts to the number of existing POS in 
the province.9 The standardization for the number of POS is made necessary by the high 
variability in the presence of POS across provinces, which is likely to affect the opportunity 
to evade (lower where the number of POS is higher). Considering the number of tax frauds 
per unit of POS (instead of their absolute value) seems a proper way to control for these 
differences at the provincial level. The inclusion of both EVAS1 and EVAS2 in our model is 
motivated by the fact that the former refers to inspections which may relate to any assumed 
fiscal irregularity (evasion of income and indirect taxes or social security contributions) in 
any type of business, while the latter certainly detects only tax frauds in sales by retailers 
(VAT and income tax evasion). Thus, EVAS1 and EVAS2 are expected to jointly provide a 
more comprehensive evaluation of the tax evasion component of shadow economy. 
3.2.3. The criminal component of the demand for cash payments 
We introduce another innovation in the traditional CDA by computing an index of crime 
(CRIME) to account for the illegal component of the shadow economy. CRIME is defined as 
the share of crimes violating the laws on drugs and prostitution over the total number of 
reported crimes in each considered province.10 The selection of the appropriate variables to 
estimate the size of the criminal component of the shadow economy deserves a brief 
explanation. Our choice of drug- and prostitution-related offenses is motivated by the focus 
on illegal activities which – in line with the definition of both the shadow economy discussed 
                                                 
7 These audits are specific in the sense that they imply inspections to firms based on ex-ante information about 
frauds that occurred within a particular operation (e.g., payment of salaries) and/or are related to a single item 
of the tax base (e.g., income taxes or social security contributions). 
8 The GDP concentration index is defined as the ratio of provincial GDP to its sample mean value. 
9  Here positive stands for audits with detected evasion. The ratio is weighed for the GDP concentration index for 
the same reasons discussed above. 
10 In analogy with tax evasion variables, also this indicator has been weighed by a GDP concentration index.   13 
above (e.g., Smith, 1994) and the illegal economy provided by the OECD (2002) – imply an 
exchange between a seller and a buyer relying on a mutual agreement and a voluntary cash 
payment. Therefore, we excluded all those crimes which, to some extent, are based on the use 
of violence made to persons or properties (burglary, extortion, etc), and then imply 
‘payments’ which do not follow an ‘agreement’ between the thief, for instance, and the 
victim.11 We also excluded those offences with possible ambiguous effects on the size of cash 
withdrawals. This is, for instance, the case of thefts, which could also have a negative impact 
on CASH due to the fact that – in an area were more robberies occur – individuals will find 
too dangerous to hold money in cash. In essence, our choice is consistent with the model to be 
estimated, which exploits information on cash withdrawals from bank accounts motivated by 
a voluntary transactional motive. 
 
3.3. Estimation methodology and results 
Equation [1] provides the complete model of the demand for cash payments to be estimated, 
that is, the structural demand reflecting the ordinary preference for liquidity augmented by 
the two components of the shadow economy, evasion and crime: 
it it it it
it it it it it
CRIME α EVAS α EVAS α
INT α ELECTRO α BANK α YPC α α CASH
ε + + + +
+ + + + =
7 6 5




We apply model [1] to a balanced panel of 91 Italian provinces observed from 2005 to 2008. 
By this, we depart from the existing CDA literature on Italy, which has so far dealt with 
country-level data. The units included in the sample represent about 90% of all the Italian 
provinces (103), and are those for which complete information were available for all the 
variables included in Equation [1]. 
The panel structure of the database allows us to account for the existence of unobservable 
residual heterogeneity across provinces. To this end, we used a random-effects Tobit model 
(Wooldridge, 2002). This model has the advantage – as compared to a standard panel 
regression with individual random effects – to accommodate for the particular distribution of 
                                                 
11 We do not account for money laundering in our analysis, since this is a criminal offense which results from 
other underlying criminal activities that amplifies in a cumulative way the impact of organized crime on both 
regular and irregular economies. The definition of recycling implies that the income stemming from a crime 
needs to be ‘cleaned up’ through the legal channel (e.g., bank transactions) in order to lower the likelihood for 
the criminal agent of being caught. After this, the ‘cleaned up’ money can be reinvested in legal activities.   14 
the dependent variable, which is censored and has a concentrated mass of positive values very 
close to zero.12 In particular, we specify the error structure of Equation [1] as εit = ui + e it, 
where u and e are individual effects and the standard disturbance term, respectively.13 
Once obtained the parameter estimates of the model, we adapt and apply the original 
procedure proposed by Tanzi (1983) for the assessment of the shadow economy. The 
(absolute) size of the underground economy is given by the ‘excess demand’ for cash 
payments unexplained by structural factors. This excess demand is obtained as the difference 
between the fitted values of CASH from the full model [1], and predicted values obtained 
from a restricted version of Equation [1] setting EVAS1 = EVAS2 = CRIME = 0. To 
evaluate the size of the two components of the shadow economy, we then proceed in a similar 
manner, by imposing alternatively the restrictions EVAS1 = EVAS2 = 0 and CRIME = 0, 
and calculating the excess demand for cash payments due to tax evasion and illegal activities, 
respectively. Given our definition of CASH, the estimates obtained in this way are expressed 
in relation to total payments settled by instruments other than cash. In order to have 
measures comparable with previous studies, we need to express our estimates of the shadow 
economy as shares of GDP. Hence, we first multiply the relevant excess demand by the 
denominator – in order to obtain the absolute value of cash transactions attributable to the 







                                                 
12 The sample mean of CASH is 0.11 (median = 0.10), with a minimum of 0.01 and a maximum of 0.24. 
Furthermore, 75% of the observations show values below 0.14. Before considering the censored nature of CASH 
and adopting the Tobit specification, we estimated our model by both LSDV and GLS panel tecniques. The 
Hausman test did not reject the GLS model. Indeed, Cameron and Trivedi (2005) argue that one of the 
weaknesses of the LSDV model is the high degree of inaccuracy of the estimates when the within variability is 
dominated by the between variability of the panel. Looking at table A2 in the Appendix, it is clear that this is 
the case for all variables of our model (except INT). In light of this, we decided to adopt a random-effects Tobit 
specification. 
13 We also experimented with a model including time effects in addition to provincial individual effects. 
However, apart from the year 2007, for which the estimated coefficient resulted negative and significant, no 
other time effect was statistically significant, while maintaining virtually unaffected the estimates for the other 
variables.   15 
Table 2. Estimated demand for cash payments (random-effects 
Tobit model – Italian provinces, 2005-2008) a  
Regressors b       MODEL A  MODEL B 
YPC  -0.030*** -0.026*** 
  (0.003) (0.004) 
BANK  -0.037*** -0.061*** 
  (0.011) (0.013) 
ELECTRO  -0.005*** -0.005*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
INT  -0.011*** -0.010*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
EVAS1   0.006***   0.006*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
EVAS2   0.027***   0.010* 
  (0.005) (0.006) 
CRIME  -   0.286*** 
   (0.063) 
Constant   0.220***   0.222*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) 
Observations            364           364 
Log-likelihood    959.08    963.96 
Wald statistic (χ2)  1969.51*** 2563.29*** 
σu   0.022***   0.023*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
σe   0.012***   0.012*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
ρ   0.772   0.784 
 (0.019)  (0.017) 
a  Dependent variable: CASH; MODEL A: equation [1] without crime indicator 
(α7 = 0); MODEL B: equation [1] with crime indicator.  
b Standard errors in round brackets; *** statistically significant at 1%; ** 
statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. 
 
Table 2 reports the estimation results. The first column show the estimates for a reduced 
version of Equation [1], accounting for tax evasion only as a component of the shadow 
economy (MODEL A). The second column report results for a complete model considering both 
tax evasion and criminal activities (MODEL B). All the estimated coefficients have the 
expected sign, and are statistically significant at the 1% level in all cases expect one. 
Moreover, the LR test (H0: MODEL A = MODEL B) confirms the importance of illegal activities   16 
(drug dealing and prostitution) for assessing the overall extent of shadow economy based on 
the CDA, as the inclusion of CRIME significantly improves the goodness of fit of the model 
(χ2(1)  =  9.76, p-value = 0.002). Finally, for both specifications the coefficient ρ – which 
measures the proportion of total residual variance explained by individual effects (u) in 
relation to the proportion explained by noise (e) – is close to 0.80, highlighting the importance 
of using panel techniques, in order to control for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity 
due to provincial-specific idiosyncratic random shocks. 
The size of the shadow economy for each province in each year has been assessed relying on 
the most comprehensive specification of MODEL B, which allows us to obtain separate measures 
for tax evasion and crime. After estimating the size of the shadow economy and its two 
components, the outlier detection analysis by Hadi (1992, 1994) led to eliminate 26 
observations, all characterised by implausibly high values. The average values reported in 
Table 3 were then obtained using the 338 remaining observations. 
 
Table 3. Size of the shadow economy as % of GDP (Italian provinces, 2005-2008)a 
  Tax evasion  Criminal economy  Shadow economy  
2005 14.5%  10.2%  24.7% 
2006 15.0%  9.6%  24.6% 
2007 18.0%  11.3%  29.3% 
2008 18.5%  12.6%  31.1% 
Average 2005-2008  16.5%  10.9%  27.4% 
a  26 outliers were dropped using the Hadi (1992, 1994) method. 
 
It is worth highlighting that the estimated size of shadow economy due to tax evasion (16.5% 
of GDP over the entire period 2005-2008) is very close to the official figures provided by the 
Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat, 2010), while Schneider and Enste (2000, 2002) 
report much higher values (above 25% from mid-90s until 2000). As already suggested by 
Zizza (2002), this discrepancy is likely to be attributable to the role played by criminal 
activities. Indeed, the ratio of the criminal economy ‘value added’ to GDP reached 11.3% in 
2007, a figure which is in line with the results provided by Eurispes (2008) for the same year 
(175 billion euros, 11.4% of GDP). The estimates of MODEL A – where the crime indicator is not   17 
included – confirms that neglecting the component of the criminal economy in the application 
of the CDA leads to overestimate shadow economy related to tax non-compliance: when 
compared with MODEL B, MODEL A leads to higher values, 21.4% on average in 2005-2008, not 
far from the estimates presented by Schneider (2010), but below the sum of tax evasion and 
criminal economy estimated in MODEL B (27.4%).14 Hence, ignoring crime as a component of 
the shadow economy brings about two possible measurement errors: muddling up tax evasion 
and illegal behaviours, on the one side, and under-estimating the total size of the shadow 
economy, on the other. 
With reference to the temporal dynamics, one can observe an increasing trend from 2005 to 
2008 for both components, although the increase appears more marked for tax evasion (+4%) 
compared to the criminal economy (+2.4%), with a sharp jump in the transition from 2006 to 
2007 (+3% and +1.7%, respectively). Such evidence may be, at least in part, due to the fact 
that in 2007 the Italian economy, like other countries in the euro zone, began to suffer the 
cyclical downturn caused by the severe world financial crisis, with a sharp slowdown in 
consumptions and investments and a strong deterioration in firms’ trust indicators (Bank of 
Italy, 2007). The negative expectations of the operators may then have led to an increased 
subtraction of taxable income to Fiscal Authorities, and a more marked use of the black 
labour market, and/or even to turn to illegal sectors of the economy (e.g., prostitution, drug 
dealing).15 
Finally, the assessment of the two components of the underground economy is of particular 
interest in the Italian case. In the light of the marked regional differentials in tax bases and 
the concentration of the organized crime in specific regions, at least two questions deserve to 
be explored. First, given the higher degree of economic and industrial development of the 
Central-Northern regions, does the size of shadow economy from tax evasion differ between 
the North and the South of the country? Second, does the prevalent localization of the 
‘headquarters’ of criminal organizations in the South of Italy imply a higher contribution of 
                                                 
14 The average incidence of the shadow economy estimated by Schneider (2010) in the years 2005-2007 
amounted to 23.3% of GDP. However, it is worth remarking that - as the estimates for the more recent years 
were derived from a combination of the MIMIC method with the CDA - the comparison in this case is more 
difficult than for the values computed up to 2000 and presented in Schneider and Enste (2000, 2002). For 
additional details, see Schneider (2010). 
15  Note that these changes in the economic cycle involve likely variations in the velocity of money, which 
presumably fell in the official economy and increased in the underground sector. This further supports the 
adoption of an estimation approach – such as the ‘revised – CDA’ proposed here – that overcomes the restriction 
of the velocity of money constant over time and identical between regular and underground economy.   18 
the Southern regions to the formation of the illegal component of the shadow economy? Or, 
instead, is it reasonable to expect minor territorial differences, due to the high mobility of 
criminal resources? 
 
Table 4. Size of the shadow economy as % of GDP in Southern and Central-Northern Italian 
provinces (2005-2008)a 
  Tax evasion  Illegal economy  Shadow economy  
CENTRE-NORTH      
2005  16.6% 11.5%  28.1% 
2006  16.6% 11.0%  27.6% 
2007  19.9% 13.0%  32.9% 
2008  20.8% 14.6%  35.4% 
Average 2005-2008  18.5% 12.5%  31.0% 
SOUTH      
2005  9.7% 7.2%  16.9% 
2006  11.3% 6.3%  17.6% 
2007  13.6% 7.4%  21.0% 
2008  13.6% 8.2%  21.8% 
Average 2005-2008  12.0%  7.3%  19.3% 
a  26 outliers were dropped using the Hadi (1992, 1994) method. 
 
According to results reported in Table 4, compared to Southern provinces, those in the 
Centre-North seem to exhibit a higher incidence of the shadow economy on GDP, both for 
tax evasion (18.5% vs. 12%) and for criminal activities (12.5% vs. 7.3%). Despite being 
against the widespread opinion about the presence of a higher shadow economy in the South 
of the country,16 such an evidence of a significant gap between Centre-North and South 
supports the results obtained by the few previous studies based on alternative estimation 
                                                 
16 This opinion largely relies on the fact that in Southern regions payments are settled by instruments other than 
cash to a lower extent than in the Centre-North. The descriptive statistics reported in Table A2 in the Appendix 
clearly show that the use of cash is higher in the South than in the rest of the country (the mean values of 
CASH are 0.09 and 0.15 in the Centre-North and in the South, respectively). However, far from being in 
contrast with our results, these statistics provide evidence that in less advanced regions, because of the lower 
degree of financial development, a higher share of transactions in the official economy are settled in cash.    19 
methodologies. Relying on time series from the early 80s to the late 90s, Bovi et al. (2002) find 
several periods with higher tax evasion in the North (either North-East or North-West, 
depending on the years) than in the South. More recently, looking at data on personal income 
taxation (IRPEF) and productive activities taxation (IRAP), Marino and Zizza (2008) and 
Pisani and Polito (2006) both conclude that in many cases tax evasion is higher in the Centre-
North than in the rest of the country. The results delivered in 2011 by the Working Group 
Economia non osservata e flussi finanziari (literally, ‘Unobserved economy and financial 
flows’) – established by the Ministry of Economy and chaired by the President of the Italian 
Statistical Office – go in the same direction. Finally, a recent survey by one of the three 
biggest unions shows the significant increase in the diffusion of irregular workers in the 
Northern regions (UIL, 2011). As for the criminal component of the shadow economy, the 
higher incidence observed for the Centre-North is probably justified by the fact that the use 
of cash for illegal transactions related to criminal activities is higher where the ‘retail 
markets’ for goods and services such as drug and prostitution are more lucrative. Hence, 
despite criminal organizations having their ‘headquarters’ predominantly localized in the 
South, our evidence seems to suggest their ability to export illegal activities in the richest 
areas of the country.17 
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we contribute to the debate on assessing the size of the shadow economy by 
providing a reinterpretation of the CDA a là Tanzi, which aims at overcoming its most 
relevant weaknesses highlighted in Scheider and Enste (2000, 2002). Our main contributions 
can be summarized as follows. First, we introduce a direct measure of cash transactions as the 
dependent variable in the money demand equation. In particular, we use the flow of cash 
withdrawn from bank accounts with respect to total noncash payments in substitution of the 
traditional money stock variable. This departure from the standard CDA has made possible 
to avoid using the Fisher equation, and the associated unrealistic assumptions of a common 
velocity of money in both the regular and the irregular sectors. Second, instead of considering 
the tax burden as the only determinant of a multi-faceted behaviour, we capture the ‘excess 
                                                 
17 The ability of criminal organizations to ‘export’ their businesses is not new in the literature. It has been 
discussed, e.g., in Varese (2011).   20 
demand’ for cash payments due to tax evasion by using two measures of detected tax non-
compliance, thus avoiding finding suitable proxies able to capture all the relevant causes of 
the phenomenon. Third, besides evasion, we identify a criminal component of the shadow 
economy, by introducing an appropriate determinant of the demand for money due to crime. 
We present an application of this ‘modified – CDA’ exploiting original data on monetary 
variables, tax evasion and reported illegal activities for the Italian Provinces over the period 
2005-2008. Our results show an average value of the shadow economy due to evasion up to 
16.5% of GDP, which is consistent with the recent estimates available from official statistical 
sources relying on microeconomic methods of measurement, but appears to be lower than the 
values obtained for Italy in the international literature (e.g., Schneider and Enste, 2000, 2002 
and Schneider, 2010). We show that this discrepancy is likely to be due to the omission of 
criminal activities in the application of the traditional CDA. Not surprisingly, when the 
model accounts for shadow criminal transactions, our estimates of the shadow economy 
increase by about 11% of GDP. This evidence points out that, ignoring illegal activities, one 
could not only mistakenly attribute to evasion a part of the shadow economy due to criminal 
transactions – for which it is not possible to implement law enforcement policies to recover 
lost tax revenues –, but could also underestimate the total value of underground economy. 
Given the availability of relevant information at a disaggregated territorial level, we also 
provide estimates of the shadow economy by macro-areas. This is an important step in the 
understanding of the underground economy and its size, because of the marked North-South 
divide in the level of economic development, institutional quality and social capital in Italy. 
The evidence we provide suggests that, compared to Southern provinces, those in the Centre-
North exhibit a higher incidence of the shadow economy relative to GDP, both for tax 
evasion and crime. While the result on crime provides fresh insights on the ability of criminal 
organizations to ‘export’ illegal activities (especially prostitution and drug dealing) in the 
richest areas where the demand is presumably higher, the finding concerning tax evasion 
stimulates future research on the determinants of this higher propensity to evade in the 
North of the country. 
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Appendix. The data 
This study uses an original dataset on a balanced panel of 91 Italian provinces observed over 
the period 2005-2008. This dataset merges information of four different sources: Bank of Italy 
(BdI),  Guardia di Finanza (GdF, the Italian Tax Police), Istat (the Italian National 
Statistical Office), and Eurostat (the Statistical Office of the European Union). All monetary 
variables are provided by BdI. Data on provincial GDP are provided by Eurostat. The 
proxies for tax evasion are computed using data on GdF fiscal inspections for the period 2005-
2008. The crime index uses information on criminal offences downloaded at 
http://giustiziaincifre.istat.it.  
 
Table A1. Data description (definition of variables and data sources) 
Variable Definition  Source 
CASH  Ratio of the value of cash withdrawn from bank accounts to 
the value of total payments settled by instruments other 
than cash  
BdI 
Structural factors   
YPC  Provincial GDP per capita  Eurostat            
BANK  Per capita number of banking accounts  BdI         
ELECTRO  Ratio of the value of transactions settled by electronic 
payments to GDP 
BdI and Eurostat           
INT  Rate of interest on bank deposits  BdI        
Tax evasion   
EVAS1  Number of specific tax audits in a province divided by its 
sample mean value (weighted by a GDP concentration index) 
GdF and Eurostat     
EVAS2  Ratio of the number of positive audits on cash registers and 
tax receipts to the number of existing POS in the province 
(weighted by a GDP concentration index) 
GdF and Eurostat 
Criminal economy 
CRIME  Share of crimes violating laws on drugs and prostitution            
over the total number of reported crimes (weighted by a 
GDP concentration index) 
Istat and Eurostat           
   25 
Table A2. Descriptive statistics  
Variable   Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Min Max   Total  Between   Within 
ITALY  a 
CASH  0.108 0.048  0.046  0.013  0.010 0.236 
YPC (×104 €)  2.491 0.596  0.590  0.099  1.235 3.908 
BANK   0.584 0.193  0.189  0.042  0.236 1.177 
ELECTRO    2.100 1.728  1.598  0.672  0.538  16.638 
INT  1.247 0.488  0.265  0.410  0.472 2.909 
EVAS1  1.151 0.594  0.575  0.159  0.222 3.839 
EVAS2  0.204 0.215  0.207  0.063  0.001 1.233 
CRIME  0.023 0.020  0.019  0.004  0.001 0.116 
CENTRE-NORTH  b 
CASH  0.090   0.041     0.039  0.012  0.010     0.204 
YPC (×104 €)  2.823   0.335 0.318 0.110  2.061 3.908 
BANK   0.684            0.129  0.125  0.036  0.304  1.177 
ELECTRO    2.399            1.962  1.802  0.800  0.538  16.638 
INT  1.299            0.504  0.261  0.432  0.472  2.909 
EVAS1  1.067              0.522 0.507 0.136  0.221  2.746 
EVAS2  0.149           0.186  0.178  0.059  0.001  1.233 
CRIME  0.022           0.021  0.021  0.003  0.001  0.115 
SOUTH  c 
CASH  0.148           0.038  0.036  0.016  0.063  0.236 
YPC (×104 €)  1.703            0.216 0.210 0.062  1.234 2.218 
BANK   0.347           0.077  0.057  0.053  0.236  0.581 
ELECTRO    1.390           0.478  0.479  0.077  0.806  2.723 
INT  1.122            0.423  0.235  0.355  0.474  2.480 
EVAS1  1.350           0.699  0.678  0.205  0.387  3.839 
EVAS2  0.335           0.224  0.215  0.0718  0.037  0.983 
CRIME  0.025     0.016  0.015  0.006  0.003  0.095 
a Figures based on a balanced panel of 91 provinces observed in 2005-2008 (364 total observations). 
b Figures based on a balanced panel of 64 provinces observed in 2005-2008 (256 total observations). 
c Figures based on a balanced panel of 27 provinces observed in 2005-2008 (108 total observations). 
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